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Experience and the Totality
Existentialist Variations on an Hegelian Theme
Robert Wood
I. The Historical Moment: Hegel

In one way this is a paper on Hegel, in another not. Its subtitle, "Existentialist
Variations on an Hegelian Theme," points in a twofold way to its genesis. I came
to Hegel out of a study of the existentialist philosophers-most especially of Martin
Buber; but I came to the existentialist philosophers out of an existential concern
with the texture of experience itself. It was an experiential, lived concern with what
turned out to be an instance of Buber's early distinction between orientation and
realization, and Heidegger's distinction between fallenness in the "They" of
everydayness and the Augenblick of existential anguish.
A. The Standard Interpretation :

Now this seems worlds removed from any concern with Hegel- at least the
Hegel of my own philosophic upbringing: Hegel the concept-monger, Hegel the
panlogist, straightjacketing history and experience within the apriori triadic schema
of thesis-antithesis and synthesis. But in the course of my study on Buber, I
encountered James Brown's question: "In the end, is Buber merely an existentialist
veneer upon Hegel?"! My own reply was that if this was the case, the veneer
reached to the center:2 wh at could be more opposed than an apriori idealistic
logician and an acute but poetic reporter of experience?
But Hegel had a lure for me-at least the young Hegel of the Spirit of Christianity
(1796) whom Buber saw as expressing the fullness of the concrete person-a
person later abandoned for the pale shadows of the Absolute Spirit in the Logic.
In his early writings Hegel proclaimed a pantheism of 10ve3 , uniting in the living
spirit of love what the concepts of the understanding break up and separate into
dry, static and empty forms.4 Such love is-and this expresses a central insight
of his whole later system- the union of union and nonunion 5 , the unity of identityin-difference. (Such a principle is central to Buber's own mature thought.) Butso the story goes- Hegel turned it into the principle of his logical system as
absolute science, which requires, as the Phenom enology of Mind states (to Kierkegaard 's horror). that "the individual must all the more forget himself, as in
fact the very nature of science implies and requires that he should."6 He must
rise to the position of the universal and infinite subject.
By 1807, in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel pours scorn upon
those who , like Jacobi , Schlegel and Schleiermach er, thought that the Truth (which
is the wholeJ1 could only be grasped by feeling, intuition. "What [such philosophy]
wants," he says, "is not so much insight as edification. The beautiful, the holy,
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the eternal, religion, love ... [;] not the notion, but ecstacy, not the march of cold
necessity in the subject-matter, but ferment and enthusiasm."8 "When such minds
commit themselves to the unrestrained ferment of sheer emotion, they think that,
by putting a veil over self-consciousness, and surrounding all understanding, they
are thus God's beloved ones to whom He gives His wisdom in sleep." Hegel adds,
"But philosophy must beware of wishing to be edifying."9 Clearly, the early
"existentialist" has experienced his Kehre and is on the road to his Aufhebung
into the Absolute.
Experience is not now the all-pervading unitary feeling of love that moves
beyond the abstractness of concepts: it is rather the "dialectic process which
consciousness executes on itself-on its knowledge as well as on its object-in
the sense that out of it the new and true object arises . . . .10 The focus of
the immediate experience of natural consciousness is on the familiarly known
singular sense-objects here-and-now, independent of the knowing subject. But the
familiarly known, is on that very account , not properly known .ll The dialectical
process is a matter of-so to speak-focusing upon the focus, working out what
is implicit in the way we have experience in the natural standpoint. Reflection is
begun by ferreting out the universality of the concepts "here" and "now" and thus
the reference back to consciousness in the familiar objects; but it recognizes in
the truth claim within the experience an appeal to the standard observer, the
universal subject to which the empirical individual I immediately gives way,12
We are already-so they say-in the realm of universal shadows: the existential
subject has disappeared.
The Phenomenology unfolds as the dialectical interrelation of subject and
object, universal and particular through all the historical shapes those relations
took, developing up to the level of Absolute Spirit which recognizes itself in the
thought of G.W.F. Hegel at the beginning of the nineteenth century on the basis
of the Prussian State. History is a matter of various trials and errors, onesided
developments dictated by the limitations of a given epoch, such as the experience
of the Absolute as the empty "Beyond" of the sense world, the Stoic grasp of
free -floating freedom , the dependency-opposition of the master-slave, the Rationalism of the Enlightment and the feeling of the Romantics. The whole process
is required before the Absolute can be "absolved" from its implicitness in natural
experience. 13 The Hegelian transcendental turn moves back to the subject-forms
in which the familiar objects appear, only to eventually discover, in the interplay
between the "outer" content and the "inner" form, not only that the forms are
"content" with respect to the structure of the human subject, but that, properly
grasped, the universal subjectivity of the subject is the Ground of the objects
themselves,l4 By getting the focus itself of immediate, familiar experience of
objects into adequate focus, one brings into view a clear cross section of what
is involved in the whole historic process. It is this that the Logic then treats in
detail from top to bottom, proceeding now from the standpoint of the Absolute.
Such ultimate getting of the focus into focus occurs, however, only when the
freshness of youth has vanished and philosophy paints its gray on gray, for the
18
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owl of Minerva only takes wing at dusk: the shape of life cannot be rejuvenated,
but only understood. IS Hegel has come a long way from his early pantheism of love
to his later panlogism of absolute Idea.
Thus a very common presentation of Hegel's development. Thus Buber's reading
of Hegel. Thus, as I now suggest, a one-sided reading of Hegel.
B. An "Existential" Approach

I am more and more inclined to agree with Kroner,16 Fackenheim l7 and others,
that Hegel was an existential thinker and in no sense a concept-monger, that philosophic comprehension depends not only upon the past experience but also the continued presence of the experience it seeks to comprehend. As Marcuse says, the
Begritt should be understood as a Begreiten, a process of moving from the finite to
the Infinite, not an accomplished state. 18 It is a process that did not stop with the
Prussian State or the emergence of the Hegelian System, for the System only
brought to clarity what was always implicit as the grounds of the possibility of
historical process.
That is the claim; what is the proof? Here I can at least sketch out the beginnings
of a proof. In his Berlin writings (and thus late in his career) he writes: " .... a
philosophy without heart [is as abstract as a] faith without understanding; .. .
philosophic thought and religious faith are part of a living whole, each fragmentary
by itself."19 "Heart" is that permanent turnedness towards the divine which gathers the whole of life into a unity: the wholeness of an individual life in relation to
the wholeness of life itself.
Thus in his Lectures on Religion he writes:
"He who has not extended his spiritual interests beyond the hurry and
bustle of the finite world, has not succeeded in lifting himself above this
life through aspiration, through the anticipation, through the feeling of
the Eternal, and who has not gazed upon the pure ether of the soul, does
not possess in himself that element which it is our object here to
comprehend. "20
But this is not simply a matter of certain inspired moments:
" ... The religion of the simple, godly man is not kept shut off and divided
from the rest of his existence and life, but, on the contrary, it breathes its
influence over all his feelings and actions, and his consciousness brings
all the aims and objects of his worldly life into relation to God , as to its
infinite and ultimate source. tt 21
Thus Fackenheim:
" ... nothing is further from Hegel's intentions than the dissipation of
human life-life in general and religious life in particular-into philosophic thought. tt22
His strictures against the Romantics have to be taken in an historical context
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where the existential base afforded by the lived life of the authentically religious
person has disappeared under the dominance of the shallow Rationalism of the
Enlightenment, so that "religion has become devoid of knowledge, and has shrivelled up into simple feeling, into contentless or empty elevation of the spiritual to
the Eternal."23 The recovery of the experiential matrix is essential for the rise to
philosophic comprehension. 24
Hegel speaks strongly against a certain detached view of the self as swallowed
up in the Absolute Spirit: in philosophy as in religion, no detached, disengaged
objectivity is possible: " ... what is to be of value to me must be verified in my
own spirit, and that I may believe I must have the witness of my spirit ... This
principle is the simple principle of philosophical knowledge itself."2s The finite
side of the ultimate finite-Infinite relation must remain as constant ground, preserved in its finitude.
And even the supposed abstractions of the Logic are to be seen as resting within
the fulness of experience. Their apparent dryness and emptiness is a function of
the experience from which they are derived: children see grammar as purely
schematic, but the student of comparative grammar and linguistics can see in it
the incarnation of a world of collective dwelling. 26 The categories of the Logic are
the life-pulse of the real world.27
Absolute Geist must then be viewed in the fulness of the nuances Geist carries:
not only spirit as divine and human, but also "spirited" as dynamic, yeasty (which
comes from German Geist), fermented like our "spirits." The dialectic ultimately
holds together the lived and and the comprehended in a single unity.
There is another existential feature to Hegel's thought. Jean Hyppolite calls our
attention to a notion Hegel entertained at the time he was working on his Phenomenology of Mind, in the Jenenser System of 1801-6. Hyppolite tells us that for Hegel
"man is the sick animal; he is aware of his death and to the degree that
he is conscious of it he becomes for himself what life is unalterably in
itself . . . The animal is unconscious of the infinite totality of life in its
wholeness, whereas man becomes the for-itself of that totality and internalizes death. That is why the basic experience of human selfconsciousness is inseparable from the fundamental experience of death."28
And in the Phenomenology of Mind itself, after the alleged Kehre, Hegel writes:
"But the life of mind is not one that shuns death and keeps clear of destruction; it endures death and in death maintains its being ... mind is
this power only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling beside
it is the magic power that converts the negative into being."29
II. The Experiential Moment: Heidegger and Huber
But enough of this sketch of Hegelian philosophy: our theme is not Hegel but
Experience and Totality. What I want to do at this point is dwell on the existentialist variations on that theme by focusing more detailed attention upon the last
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"existentialist" theme 1 have referred to above in Hegel. namely the experience
of staring the negative in the face and wresting one's being from it.
A. Heidegger: Being-Towards-Death 30

Consider our present situation: located side by side in space with the familiar
objects of everydayness-tables, chairs, people- a room opening up into the
corridor; each of us with his own anticipations and desires built up out of past
experiences and choices, giving structure to the meaning-bearing sights and sounds
involved in the delivery of this paper. Suddenly the lecturer begins to gasp for
breath, his face turns red and then blue, his eyes bulge. He falls forward, upsetting
the podium and collapses on the floor-dead. The group is immediately in a turmoil. And perhaps one or the other of us may reflect-"philosophically" as they
say-"Death comes to everyman! "-a general truth excised from the concrete
flow of events. And perhaps another might easily carry out the syllogistic deduction: "I am one of these Everyman, so death comes to me also." There really is no
difficulty in carrying out this type of reflection : anyone of us might do it at any
time, and each time, attending carefully to the proper form and content of syllogistic reasoning, assure himself that he has got a real truth. And so we can add it
to our mounting mass of knowledge that we have acquired, "for the sake of knowledge," as they also say.
But after all, we might reflect, this is not just another truth. It is an important
truth, important to me. On its basis I may be led-perhaps under the prompting
of a preacher [hardly likely today!]- to allow that truth to exercise causality upon
the way in which my life flows on: if I am to die, maybe I should do x and cease
doing y and z. Standing outside the stream of experience, in the splendid isolated
purity of abstract truth, the syllogism directs my life.
Hold now these two elements before your mind's eye: the excised truth and
the flow of living experience, and focus upon the content of living experience
itself. A new truth emerges: that in the normal flow of life as lived my death
does not usually enter in a significant way, that as I normally grasp myself, it is
as a perduring center of attention from which others may ind ee d be absent in
the mode of having died, but which itself persists as the permanent furniture of
the universe-indeed, in a way, as its center. Immediately, non-objectively, I grasp
myself, I live as if I were always around, and around in the condition in which
I find myself: I live under an almost permanent inner optical illusion, the illusion
of the eternal present. The excised truth of objective mortality allows me to see
this, but the " I" that appears in the syllogism is an anonymous function of the
proposition: the objective truth does not of itself make present the concrete I
of the life world. "Ordinary" philosophic reflection, engaged as it generally is with
truths-in-general, only serves to foster the illusion of the eternal present and thus
conceals my death as an occurrence within the life-experience as it reveals it in
terms of the timeless syllogism. The existential truth is hidden in the revelation
of the essential, i.e. universal, truth.
There is, then, a further move to make. At first we effected a split within

Published by eCommons, 1971

21

5

University of Dayton Review, Vol. 8 [1971], No. 1, Art. 4
experience between the abstract grasp of the syllogistic truth-for-every-I and the
concrete flow of living experience wherein death only enters as the death of the
Other. Then the sparks began to leap between these two poles by bringing them
into relationship with each other: the abstract truth guiding the events in the
stream of experience by the judgment of personal import, then illuminating by
contrast the content of the stream as involved in an inner illusion. Now, it is
possible for the truth to enter into the stream itself as a kind of concrete universal
where the concrete I is not subsumed into the truth-in-general, but the truth-ingeneral and the concrete I mutually interpenetrate. This is the moment of vision,
Heidegger's Augenblick of Angst, which, contrary to the positivists and the objectivists, does not simply add "emotional" and thus "merely subjective" coloration to the "real" and "objective" truth. It is precisely sight, or rather
"vision," unencumbered by the purely emotional aspects of trembling and fear,
transcending by subsuming both the emotional overtones and the objective truth
in a vision which is itself best characterized as serene.
It is not simply a matter here of another kind of experience: this experience
pulls us out of the routinized behaviour and judgments of the "they"-self,
radically individuates us, and reveals by contrast what it means to be now. The
realization of Being-towards-death is the lived epocbe placed about the ordinary
life-world. It is the distance which reveals closeness, the absence that reveals
presence. In the moment of vision the whole of one 's life is brought to attention,
gathered together out of the distractedness of the everyday.31 And as in Plato's
metaphor of the dream, only when one awakens does he discover the dream to
be a dream ,32 so also here , when one sees his own death he then realizes that by
contrast his living experience and his abstract thought have been, as it were, a
dream. In this connection, Heraclitus noted long ago (and I think he is here only
enunciating the ancient wisdom of polarity which Buber, for one, has attempted
to reawaken), opposites reveal : It is by sickness that health-which goes without
saying in our ordinary life-experience-is revealed ; and by hunger and thirst, we
first know satiety; so also, by death as experienced in the moment of vision, we
first come to know life in the limitless depth of the soul's own logos .33 As
Buber says, "The script of life is so unspeakably beautiful to read because death
looks over our shoulder."34
Death, he says, is not to be limited to an y particular moment of ceasing to be
or of transformation, for it is the ever present mother of being.35 Buber's Daniel
concludes on this note : "You wish to know . .. the unity that bears life and
death . . . You cannot know it otherwise than when you take upon yourself the
tension between life and death ... Th en the I of this tension will awaken to
you the unconditioned- the unity of life and death." J6
For Heidegger the presence of his own death gathers a person into preparedness
for responsible action in the present: it attunes him to the unpredictable texture
of the historical situation in an awe that reveals the imperishable.37 Out of that
situation emerges th e Thou.

22
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B. Buber: Encounter With the Thou
Buber terms the sort of awareness we have in the everyday world "orientationknowing how to get around, be it in the world of bodies or in the social world
or in the world of thought. It is the region of the I-It relation. 38 The awareness
of death is an instance of the general mode of awareness called "realization,"
which awakens our totality.39 Buber goes on to center his major attention upon
what is revealed in attention to the historic situation, namely the Thou. Beingtowards-death reveals the identity, the sameness, the being of the Self, through
encounter with the self's own ultimate non-being (at least the non-being of the
self as Being-in-the-world). But it is still the self's own non-being. For Buber this
is still "subjective": the Self's fuller identity is brought to awareness through
encounter with the other than self-with the Thou. 4o
Now the meaning of the Thou has been severly distorted in many popular
versions. First of all, the Thou is not simply another person: it is any other,
revealed in the mode of realization , in its real otherness. Buber speaks of the
Thou in relation to a stone, a tree, a cat, a horse , a work of art, as well as a
person. 41 There are three regions of relation: nature, persons and what he calls
'forms of the spirit, i.e. embodiments or potential embodiments in the regions of
forming (which terminates in an art object), thinking (which terminates in the
word) and acting (which terminates in the formed life).42
In all these regions the Thou is not something antecedently there to which we
have merely to relate by a respectful attitude: the Thou is an event that occurs
through the meeting of our attitude and a "grace," a gift which we can never
demand and for which we can only be prepared.43 Non-preparedness consists in
dwelling within the routinized closure of the "they" -self, the region of I-It. Now
new disclosures constantly appear within this region: the stream of experience
flows on with continuing variation; science makes constant new discoveries; the
economy progresses. But the lived horizons within which these disclosures go on
are themselves closed: 44 truth as correspondence goes on but the moment of vision
which initially opened the horizons disappears. 45
For Buber, non-routinized attentiveness discloses the Thou in many surprising
ways. And in each Thou-disclosure, as authentic manifestation of otherness, the
self is gathered up and revealed in its own identity. One slips back and forth
from scatteredness to identity, from " they"-self to authentic I until these many
experiences of Being terminate in one experience of Faith where they are revealed
as words spoken by a single Voice and the unity of one's life is grounded. 46
The Being of things is their being spoken by God. And just as in any situation
of discourse, one might, e.g., attend to the empirically objective sights and soundsas a physicist might approach this lecture; or one might attend to the music of
pure sound as it unfolds ; or one might grasp more or less of the meaning whose
communication is being attempted; so in relationship with beings, we constantly
fall- such is our lot-into various modes of objectification: only one who attends
to the full being of things really hears wha t is bei ng said.
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III. The Moment of Comprehension
That is all very "mystical"-Le. fuzzy and subjective-one might very well say
at this point. Is there any sort of hard proof that this is the case-or at least some
demonstration of its possibility?
Buber did attempt some philosophic comprehension of this situation later in
his life. Heidegger has constantly moved in the direction of providing the
existential-ontological grounds for existentiell-ontic experiences. And Hegel worked
with such comprehension throughout his life, as we have already indicated.
However, I want to come clear at this point on my own position, with Buber,
Heidegger and Hegel hovering in the background. I want to make the Hegelian
move-which is really the philosophic move-of focusing upon the focus of
awareness, expli citating what is implicit in the way in which we attend to objects
in our everydayness, thereby (hopefully) disclosing the nature of experience in
relation to the Totality.
A. Intentionality and the Perceptual Object:
The metaphysics which underlies contemporary everydaynes s is the metaphysics
of observedness: to be is to be object-of-observation. The reality of the self and
the other is simply a set of complex observables . The story of perception is the
story of observable objects, light sources, light waves and their propagation, absorption and reflection ; eye balls, lenses , retinas, rods and cones, optic nerves ,
synaptic connections and point "x" in the back of the brain where awarenes s
occurs.
Up to this point, nothing has been said of awareness-and at that point nothing
has been said except that it (whose name alone has been disclosed) occurs. Furthermore , to claim that point x is the only place where it occurs leaves one with
no grounds for even knowing point x, much less all the rest of physics and
physiology, for it is assumed in the explan ation that the objects of physics
and physiology are given "as they are."
But for them to be given "as they are" requires tha t they be given as oth er
than point x where allegedly visual awareness occurs-as other, Le., than the
vision which reveals them . But that they be given as other involves the givenness
simultaneously of the same as same, for there is no manifest other save there be
a manifest self, other than which the other is. The original situation is thus a
kind of Between, a presence-of-and-to, of the other to the self, whereby both are
disclosed . But in the initial disclosure the other in its observations is the focus.
However, reflection upon the progress of physics in the investigation of light
makes clear that the way in which otherness is manifested in visual immediacy
is within the extremely limited thresholds set up by the needs of the organism .
So that the other in its immediate observed ness is not the other fully as other,
but the other as other-for-orga nism .

B. The "As" Structure:
Furthermore it is not simply a matter of our visua lly attending to the individual
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other in its observedness; it is a matter of attending to individuals as something.
It is this "as" that opens up the human phenomenon. To see a particular configuration in my visual field as chalk is to bring to bear upon my particular
experience a mode of configurating that is a funcion of my historic community
and which views the actual in terms of projection into the possible. That as which
I see it discloses an anticipative relation I have to all actual or possible instances
of the kind of question: the whole of space-time is anticipated in the structure
of the "as." Further, it is not simply a matter of relating an isolated universal
intention to an isolated sensed-object, for the meaning of "chalk" is a function
of the relation of the concept to the whole world of communication as one mode
of dwelling of an historical community.
To manifest this as chalk is to manifest the present thing as related to its own
temporal extension. In such manifestation, the self is even more self-manifest as
being ahead of its here-and-now sensory act, anticipating the field of possibilities
in relation to its throwness within an historic situation. 47
C. Relation to the Totality:

One step more: to assert that this "is" chalk is not only to be sensorily present
to the "this" and "intellectually" present to the world of meaning whose node
is the concept "chalk": the concept chalk and its "un packers" are all universal intentions, related to all actual or possible instances of the kind in question; but the
"is" articulates a reference to all actual or possible beings of whatever kind. Of
what can you say "that it is"? Of anything whatsoever, of the absolute Totality.
How many is that? When we bring in the notion of the possible: limitless, in-finite.
This notion of the In-finite, which is the notion of Being, is not derived from
the finite but is present in the way in which we attend to the finite. In the light
of this apriori reference to the whole of what is or can be, whatever enters the
field of attention is brought to illumination as being what it is: the notion of all
actual or possible instances is contracted to all actual or possible instances of the
kind in question as the kind of the individual is extended to all of its kind. 48
Presence to the totality within the bodily context of presence to the environment of sensed individuals is the apriori nature of the self. This constitutes the
ground of our modes of attending, the ground for establishing varying universes
of discourse as modes of attending. But it is not explicit in our usual modes of
attending, especia lly as we have come more and more under the dominance of
the metaphysics of observed ness.
But in the anticipative relation to the Whole of what is, the whole of the self
and any encounterable other are necessarily included. The Whole is open, the
self is open, the other is open, but open only as the not-positively-revealed, as the
More than fits within the phenomenal manifestation of the senses and the culturally imminent modes of discourse. We attend to the positively revealed-this
is the World of It. But in it the full self is lost. Openness to the Whole makes
possible that disengagement from the positively manifest which allows coming
face to face with the Not of our own dying. But it likewise makes possible that
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sensitizing to the More that appears in great art, religious experience and authentic
love. Dwelling in relation to the More is establishing a sense of the mystery of
presence, where the manifestation of the ultimate otherness of an other awakens
us to the fullness of ourselves.
To learn to dwell in the infinite distance of the More is to distantiate oneself
from the other as sense-presence and the other as culturally interpreted; it is to
be enabled to come near to the other as other-in its being, i.e. in the fullness
of itself. The interior life of man is not away from things, not away from the body
and its senses, but in the nearness of beings: maximum interiority is maximum
exteriority. To be most oneself is to manifest otherness, which is to achieve
maximal identity with the other. Identity-in-difference, the union of union-anrlnonunion is comprehensible in the clear analysis of intentionality. But what prevents us from such clear comprehension is our fixity in the metaphysics of
observedness, for which to be is to be separate from the other; for a metaphysics
of intentionality, to be is to be related in an identity-in-difference.
And if to be is to be rooted in the Infinite (as our own implicit structure suggests), response to the full otherness of the Other issues into response to the
wholly other Otherness of God. But we are a long way from anything but a mere
suggestion of what would be involved in comprehending that more fully.5o
*
*
*
An Hegelian-styled dialectric exercised upon the conscious self and the manifest Other yields the authentic "object" which is the mystery of presence. But one
is nudged in that direction by an experiential break with the experience of everydayness, by a clear manifestation of the Not in Being towards Death and in the
graced encounter with the Thou . And only permanent openness for encounter
with mystery preserves the moment of philosophic comprehension from that inauthenticity which flees from the uncertainty of mystery to the comfort of pleasure
and calculation.
Take this as a kind of stumbling exegesis upon an old adage: Primum vivere,
deinde philosophari. But understand the "deinde" not in a chronological sense,
but as a logical transition between the two moments of lived experience and
philosophic comprehension. Philosophic comprehension is rooted in lived experience and preserves for lived experience the space within which it can come
to its fullness in an era of the darkening of the earth, the standardization of man,
and the disappearance of the Holy.
5t. Joseph's College, Rensselaer
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